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Abstract
Directed energy weapons (DEW) are of interest to the armed forces as they search
for more effective ways to deal with evolving threats. The development of these weapons
has been ongoing for almost 40 years, despite only one operational fielding by the U.S.
Navy in 2014. Some reasons for DEW’s lack of adoption by the services include cost
overruns and unclear requirements. Early adoption of human systems integration (HSI) in
the military’s acquisition process is shown to provide substantial cost savings over the
life of the system. Quantifying the application of HSI within a DEW acquisition program
is addressed through decision analysis using value-focused thinking (VFT). The VFT
model helps program managers and HSI practitioners balance total system performance
and cost of ownership. Knowledge gathered from expert elicitation was used to create the
decision model consisting of objectives in a hierarchal format. The proposed VFT model
is a beginning step that allows for an objective analysis of HSI efforts in a DEW
acquisition program. Further work is required to make the model practical for use.
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MEASURING HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION IN
DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPON ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

I.

Introduction

Science fiction has long had a love affair with the laser. The Martians in H.G.
Wells’ 1898 book The War of the Worlds used invisible heat ray weapons. The 1964
James Bond film Goldfinger portrayed the use of a laser beam that could cut through
solid gold. Perhaps the most well-known use of a laser in science fiction is the Death Star
from Star Wars, which can destroy entire planets. These classic examples depict lasers
exclusively as weapons and spawned real-life application of such devices. Wells’ heat ray
weapons are seen today as infrared lasers. The James Bond laser foreshadowed extensive
industrial laser use in the 1970s. Unsurprisingly, laser technology has not yet reached the
level depicted in Star Wars.
Lasers are the most easily recognized type of directed energy (DE) and have so
far taken the majority of the monetary investment into these programs (Welch &
Hermann, 2007). However, the energy also comes in several other forms such as highpowered microwaves (HPM), particle-beams, and sonic or ultrasonic waves (Antal,
2013). All forms of DE hold potential for weaponization due to some advantages over
conventional weapons. Directed energy weapons (DEW) are more precise, have a lower
cost per shot, and can be scaled. A criticism of some currently used kinetic weapons is
their high cost relative to the target they are neutralizing. DEWs promise to reverse the
cost so the threat being neutralized is more expensive than the weapon being used to
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target it. However, DEWs are at a disadvantage in that they are line-of-sight weapons
with no indirect fire capability. DEWs also suffer from beam attenuation, which is the
reduction in intensity of the beam as it passes through matter (McKetty, 1998). Matter in
the atmosphere such as dust, smoke, and water vapor can cause the beam to attenuate, by
no means a small problem in adverse weather conditions where conventional kinetic
weapons may function better.
The weaponization of lasers are of interest to all branches of the military as they
look towards the future in search of more effective ways to deal with evolving threats.
Lasers are generally agreed to hold the most promise for a wide range of applications
such as destroying incoming projectiles or disabling vehicles. The laser as a weapon is
still developing as work is done to increase power and range while using less energy and
occupying a smaller footprint. As research and development continues, the first fielding
of such weapons has already taken place by the U.S. Navy in 2014 (Feickert, 2018) and
the next step for the military is determining which platforms to use laser-based weapons
on and for what application. Considerations for these next generation weapons include
initial and operating costs, personnel and training requirements, safety concerns, and
possible ethical dilemmas.
The U.S. does not own a monopoly on DEWs. Adversaries, potential adversaries,
and allies have varying degrees of their own DEW programs. Although not proven, there
were claims of sonic and ultrasonic attacks on U.S. diplomats in both Cuba and China in
recent years (Fu, Xu, & Yan, 2018). Sonic, or audible, devices are already used
throughout the world by police and military forces as crowd control devices. Recognizing
that some of the DE technology is already viable and fielded, a real concern of military
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officials is being outpaced by other countries’ DEW technology and procurement. The
John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 reflects these
sentiments with $915 million authorized for DE research, development, test, and
evaluation; additionally, $22 million was authorized for the construction of a directed
energy systems integration lab (115th Congress, 2018). This proves a willingness of the
government to trust in the Department of Defense’s (DoD) assessment that monetary
resources should be applied to the DE field to further the military’s capabilities.
Getting DEWs in the military’s arsenal is a process. The military acquisition
process is broken into five phases: material solution analysis, technology development,
engineering and manufacturing development, production and deployment, and operations
and support (Carr & Greene, 2009b). Preceding those five phases is the first stage,
development. In the most general sense, this is where an operational requirement is
identified, potential alternatives are analyzed, Congress authorizes and appropriates
funds, proposals are gathered, and contractors are selected to begin work on the program
(Fox, Allen, Lassman, Moody, & Shiman, 2011). The entire process is long, arduous, and
subject to much bureaucracy.
Cost overruns are an almost inevitable part of military acquisition programs.
Many major defense programs take at least 15 years to come to fruition while also
coming in over double the budget and being delivered with less capability than originally
defined (Fox et al., 2011). Without completely revamping the military acquisition
process, there are multiple ways in which the risk of outrunning the budget can be
mitigated. One method is to take a multitude of factors into account at the beginning of
the program using proven techniques such as decision analysis. Some factors indicating
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decision analysis may be a good choice for DEW acquisition are complexity, conflicting
consequences, and uncertainty. The DEW, acquisition process, and HSI are all complex
entities by themselves. The ability to quantify values in decision analysis reduces the
complexity to a point where it can be understood and analyzed. Decision analysis is good
for problems with conflicting consequences because of its use of objective trade-offs.
That is, risk may be reduced in one area while simultaneously increasing another area
(Goel, 1992). Finally, the uncertainty of outcomes lends itself to decision analysis
through its use of value functions for decisions made under certainty and utility functions
for decisions made under uncertainty.
Part of systems engineering (SE) includes the relationship between the human and
the system. This management process is known as human systems integration (HSI).
NASA’s depiction of 32 programs in Figure 1 show that those investing less than 5% on
SE are almost guaranteed an 80% or greater overrun. Applying decision analysis
techniques on HSI within DEW programs could give the project a better chance of
meeting its time and budget goals.

Program Overrrun
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Figure 1. Total Program Overrun (adapted) (Gruhl, 1992)
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The information shown in Figure 1 demonstrates that “defining the project” is
often underfunded and overlooked, thereby costing significant amounts of extra money.
This coincides with Figure 2, which shows the estimated HSI investment range. This
research does not investigate the actual monetary values but instead focuses on the
evaluation of HSI based on HSI's importance as demonstrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2.
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Figure 2. HSI Investment Estimate (adapted) from Impact of SE at NASA
(as cited in Booth, 2009)

1.1

Background
The Air Force published the results of the Air Superiority 2030 Flight Plan study

(Department of the Air Force, 2016) into developing capabilities to maintain air
superiority in 2030 and beyond. It shows the Air Force expects threats to its air
superiority to evolve along two major fronts over the next 11 years, traditional threat
systems and a series of comprehensive capabilities. It is understood that near-peers have
5

advanced fighter aircraft, sensors, and weapons. However, these traditional technological
threats are quickly spreading to other countries and the Air Force sees increasing threats
in ever expanding locations and scenarios. The second threat comprises capabilities that
negate the Air Force’s current advantages in the space domain; it includes increased
number and complexity of cyberspace threats, and increased sophistication of air threats
like hypersonic missiles and conventional ballistic missile systems. The Air Force does
not see itself as capable of fighting and winning against these emerging threats with its
projected force structure and current acquisition process (Department of the Air Force,
2016).
The results of the Air Superiority 2030 Flight Plan invariably lead to the need for
new or improved technology and systems. The study (Department of the Air Force, 2016)
recognizes the development of next generation weapon systems often becomes mired in
cycles of ever increasing costs in part due to technology that has not caught up to the
idea. The culprit exists in many forms whether it be an overly aggressive timeline, not
devoting enough resources to the project, or not focusing on the right problem. Formal
acquisition programs generally do not mesh well with cutting edge technology and
inevitably underperform. Because of these problems, the Air Force chartered Enterprise
Capability Collaboration Team (2016) recommends shifting the focus from “next
generation” platforms to a collaborative effort between science and technology,
acquisition, requirements, and industry professionals. The new approach requires
adaptable and affordable processes.
A way to address the real problem is to use practiced and proven methods early in
the acquisition process. One such method is value-focused thinking (VFT), an approach
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developed by Keeney (1992) that looks at values as the means to create alternatives and
make decisions. VFT is later described as an interactive approach to decision analysis
(Parnell, Bresnick, Tani, & Johnson, 2013). Using VFT allows a decision-maker to focus
on what really matters. As such, VFT is an excellent candidate to assess the maturity and
readiness of potential “game-changing” technologies such as DE. Decision analysis using
VFT does a good job of dealing with subjectivity from the entire process.
Any new acquisition program’s total ownership cost can be reduced with the
integration of HSI (Honour, Axelband, & Rhodes, 2004; Liu, 2010; Onkham,
Karwowski, & Ahram, 2012). As noted in Figure 1, increased investment in the defining
phases normally results in reduced program overruns. Although the total savings vary
between programs, early investment and realization of SE and HSI generally keeps cost
overruns in the negligible to 75% range (Gruhl, 1992), significantly less than the 80180% range of programs with minimal SE and HSI investment. The DoD acknowledged
the fact when they mandated the incorporation of HSI early in the acquisition cycle (Liu,
Valerdi, Rhodes, Kimm, & Headen, 2010).
Different agencies and military departments define HSI differently. However,
they generally agree that HSI is, in a most general sense, the optimization of total system
performance with the human operator. The Air Force divides HSI into nine domains:
manpower, personnel, training, environment, safety, occupational health, habitability,
survivability, and human factors engineering (Carr & Greene, 2009a). The human factors
domain tends to make the most headlines due to its direct relation between the human
operator and the system.
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1.2

Problem Statement
An overarching goal of defense acquisition could be characterized as, “make

America stronger, now and in the future” by administering efficient, quality, state of the
art acquisition programs (Ward, 2011). The successful incorporation of HSI into the
acquisition effort at the earliest possible point can substantially reduce life cycle costs.
While the current methods for applying HSI to acquisition programs are detailed in
numerous Air Force manuals and handbooks, it is unknown if there is a better way to
measure HSI within a particular program. Simply applying HSI wherever it can be fit in
does not determine if the correct HSI domains are being addressed and to what extent
trade-offs should be made.
DEWs are billed as a cost-effective solution to using increasingly expensive
kinetic weapons to combat adversaries’ progressively sophisticated weapons. DEW
development is not unlike other Defense acquisition programs in that there are immense
pressures to balance total system performance and cost of ownership. Knowing which
HSI elements to incorporate into a program and give priority to can assist decisionmakers early in the acquisition process. Assessing how well a DEW acquisition program
has incorporated the HSI elements can help the program stay on track and within budget.
The inability to determine if HSI efforts are focused correctly is a problem that needs to
be addressed.
Knowledge is sometimes defined as individual and institutional. Individuals’
knowledge comes and goes with the individual while institutional knowledge is retained
within the organization. A concern of many organizations is losing the knowledge
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possessed by individuals as they depart because of the inability to transfer that knowledge
into institutional knowledge.
1.3

Objectives and Approach

1.3.1 Objectives
The overall objective of this research is to answer how decision analysis using
VFT can be used to assess the application of HSI within a DEW acquisition program.
Four investigative questions are used:
•

How can an expert’s knowledge of the manpower, personnel, training, human
factors, and safety HSI domains be represented in a value hierarchy?

•

How can knowledge, both tacit and explicit, be captured from an HSI expert and
transferred to someone else?

•

How can captured knowledge improve a DEW acquisition program?

•

How can the importance of each HSI domain be identified?

1.3.2 Approach
Even though each DEW acquisition program is different in terms of size, scope,
and purpose, they all involve some elements of HSI. This analysis will focus on
identifying which elements are important so the right amount of time and effort can be
put towards those specific elements. The use of decision analysis in this research is
largely predicated on its successful application in various other fields. Decision analysis
has been used successfully by Ford when deciding whether to produce its own tires, by
Pillsbury on whether to use boxes or bags for certain products, and by Honeywell to
evaluate the attractiveness of weapons programs (Ulvila & Brown, 1982). As noted by
Morais et al. (2013), decision analysis using the VFT philosophy has been used by the
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Air Force to select innovative force protection ideas (Jurk, Chambal, & Thal, 2004), the
Croatian Armed forces to select an automatic rifle (Peharda & T, 2008), a publishing
company to examine the strategic implications of mobile technology (Sheng, Nah, &
Siau, 2005), and a tourist management company to assess the vitality of rural areas
(Kajanus, Kangasb, & Kurttilac, 2004).
1.4

Assumptions
Decision analysis problems involve some level of uncertainty. The uncertainty

can arise from incomplete facts or knowledge about future events that affect choices
made in the present. Decisions made under certainty, that is, when decision-makers know
the outcome of selecting an alternative, use value functions for calculations. Decisions
made under uncertainty, or when the outcome of selecting an alternative are unknown,
use utility functions. This research uses value functions because alternative selection in
the acquisition process means that alternative will proceed while alternatives not selected
will not move forward. Furthermore, lack of data for this research made the use of value
functions obligatory.
The assessment of HSI using VFT has not been previously applied directly to a
DEW program. Uncertainty regarding changes to the DEW program will not be
considered because the hierarchy can be modified to account for changes when they
happen. Furthermore, utilizing VFT and its hierarchy in the first place should help keep
the program on track by initially determining the importance of HSI.
This research is predicated on the assumption that the sponsor is an expert. The
sponsor was used for virtually all pertinent steps in building the model. If he turned out
not to be an expert, the model would be virtually useless as a defendable method for
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measuring HSI. It should be noted that a different expert could, and probably would,
come up with a different set of values for the model. However, the sponsor/expert used in
this research is by all accounts an expert in the related fields and qualified to assist.
For this research to have a meaningful impact, the assumption was made that the
military acquisition process will not depart radically from its current format in the next 10
to 20 years. The process has remained relatively stable over the years and there are no
indications that this will change. The need for this assumption is directly related to the
small scope this research covers, namely HSI in DEW acquisition programs. There are
not many, if any, non-military uses for the specifics of the model being presented.
1.5

Preview
Chapter II covers the history of DEWs including what has been tried, what has

failed, currently used DEWs, and what the military expects to use in the near future. The
military acquisition process will be discussed, focusing on the general flow and how
programs are evaluated from start to finish. Examples of the importance of HSI will also
be discussed with an emphasis on military application. Decision analysis using VFT
examples, advantages, and disadvantages will be covered. Finally, experts and knowledge
will be discussed. Chapter III provides the “how-to” of the VFT model and shows why
VFT can be utilized for this particular problem. It also covers knowledge elicitation
techniques and choosing the right expert. Chapter IV covers the model’s hierarchy and
how it would be applied. In conclusion, Chapter V discusses areas of future research and
insights gained from this research.
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II. Literature Review

This chapter reviews current and projected directed energy weapon (DEW)
applications as well as the acquisition process and how acquisition programs are
evaluated. It also covers human systems integration (HIS), positive and negative
outcomes of HSI, decision analysis using value-focused thinking (VFT), and examples of
VFT implementation. The end result should be an understanding of the complex and
difficult process to field a DEW with the appropriate HSI principles and how VFT could
be used to do so.
2.1

Directed Energy Weapons
For years, DEWs resided in the realm of science fiction. The end of the 19th

century saw a type of DEW, the heat ray, introduced to the public through the novel War
of the Worlds. Although the heat ray was a fictional weapon in a science fiction book, the
general concept is pretty close to the reality of infrared lasers. It is not quite the DEW that
people imagine, being invisible as opposed to a visible laser.
As noted by the Department of State (1983), the military began researching
DEWs in earnest during the 1980s, after President Ronald Reagan proposed the Strategic
Defense Initiative program (SDI). The announcement focused on a plan to defend the
country from nuclear attack by way of a space-based missile defense program. Futuristic
technology was proposed, including space-based lasers that had not yet been developed.
The President’s announcement raised questions as noted by Levi (1983) that are still
relevant today.
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•

What missions might such weapons systems fulfill?

•

What hurdles currently block the way to practical realization of these systems?

•

What arguments are being made for and against DEW systems?

2.1.1 Missions
What missions might such weapons systems fulfill? DEWs are generally
envisioned as defensive weapons. From the military’s initial vision of DEWs providing
protection from nuclear attack to a more recent but similar vision of countering incoming
rockets, artillery, and mortars (C-RAM), the defensive capabilities have always seemed
more viable than offensive ray-gun type efforts. The Air Force outlined three distinct
areas of interest: forward base defense, aircraft self-protection, and precision strike
(Stanley, 2018). It should be noted that the defensive capabilities of DEWs could feasibly
be used in an offensive role, if desired.
2.1.2 Hurdles
What hurdles currently block the way to practical realization of these systems?
Much of the technology for DEWs has matured over the last 30 years, reaching a point
where it could be used by the military, given the right mission set. Previously, and to a
lesser extent now, the size, weight, and power requirements of a DEW system were a
hindrance to practical operational use. Ethical considerations are discussed in 2.1.4.
2.1.3 Arguments
What arguments are being made for and against DEW systems? Proponents in
favor of DEW systems have not changed their selling points in any meaningful way over
the years. Alexander (2008) explains the attractiveness of DEWs as scalability, speed-oflight engagement, low-cost per shot, extremely precise targeting, and unlimited
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magazine. Scalability refers to the potential to dial the power up to burn through targets
or dial it down to do just enough damage to cause mission failure. Adjusting power is a
simplification of what the operator does to the focus of the beam by manipulating the
intensity, duration, and wavelength of the beam. Scalability on its own offers a
uniqueness not seen in conventional weapons. A conventional projectile has predictable
behavior once it is fired. The scalability factor of a DEW allows the same weapon system
to be used for multiple scenarios.
Alexander (2008) also explains what is probably the second biggest selling point
of DEWs – the engagement speed. Conventional weapons take time to reach the target
and depend on things like speed of jet engines or rocket propulsion, detonation of
gunpowder, or ballistic velocity. DEWs, on the other hand, can hit the target almost
instantaneously after acquisition. The operator can place energy on target at the speed of
light, matching the speed of the other parts of the detect-to-kill chain.
The low-cost per shot of a DEW compared to a conventional weapon is explained
with a Javelin missile example. Whereas the shoulder fired Javelin missile costs over
$100,000, firing a DEW at the same target has a cost only of the energy it uses.
Comparatively, the DEW is magnitudes cheaper to fire than conventional weapons.
Similarly, a DEW’s magazine load is essentially limited by the amount of available
energy or power source. The exception to both points are chemical-based lasers, which
need the chemical in order to function. Finally, a DEW is extremely precise in its
targeting. It is as simple as keeping the beam pointed directly on the target.
Detractors of DEW systems tell a different story. The advantages of DEWs are
agreed upon, but the benefits do not paint the full picture. A DEW’s speed-of-light
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engagement does not mean the target will be destroyed or disabled instantaneously. It
means the beam can reach the target at the speed of light. There is still time needed to
have effects upon the target.
Another major negative characteristic of DEWs are their sensitivity to
atmospheric conditions such as dust, moisture, and turbulence (Alexander, 2008).
Anything less than an ideal atmosphere can lead to a weakening of the beam and
reduction or elimination of the DEW’s intended effects on the target. By virtue of DEWs
being beams of energy, they are also strictly line-of-sight weapons and have no indirect
fire capability. This could potentially be a problem when the operator is in a defilade or
behind cover, forcing them into a less secure position for the sake of firing the DEW.
The size and weight of DEWs are also an issue. In general, a more powerful laser
system will be larger and heavier than a less powerful system. This can pose problems
when attempting to integrate powerful DEWs with a smaller vehicle or person. In
essence, the mobility of powerful DEWs can be prohibitive. More powerful DEWs also
use more power, resulting in the need for a larger power source and thus a larger
platform. The issue of ricochet must also be considered. On the positive side, DEWs are
extremely precise. However, lasers and other energy beams are not totally absorbed by
the material they encounter. When the energy is reflected away, it must go somewhere,
thus potentially causing unintended damage away from the target.
2.1.4 Ethical Concerns
Physical characteristics are not the only concerns with DEWs. As with any new
weapon system, there are bound to be ethical debates and discussions on proper use.
DEWs, particularly laser weapons, are addressed in the Protocol of Blinding Lasers, part

15

of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. This protocol
prohibits deliberate and permanent blinding by lasers on the battlefield (Backstrom &
Henderson, 2012). This means lasers are permitted under law, with the only prohibition
being deliberate, permanent blindness. Many militaries use lasers as range finders or may
utilize optical dazzlers. These devices work well as intended, but could be used to cause
blindness if operated outside the normal specifications, such as too close to a target or
aiming directly into a person’s eyes.
Critics envisioned DEWs being used in space and pushed for a ban on weapons in
space (Levi, 1983). There are still no laws banning the use of DEWs in space, only
Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty that bans nuclear or other weapons of mass
destruction from orbit (Dembling & Arons, 1967). This alludes to a possible legal hurdle
for DEWs: their potential for dual purpose use in armed conflict (Leins, 2016).
The advent of DEWs also brought concerns of ethical employment of such
weapons. Numerous studies have been inconclusive and erred on the side of negligible
effects of low-level radio frequency energy on humans (Jauchem, 2008). This includes
exposure to radio-frequency energy such as cell phones, microwaves, and radio
transmissions. All these exposures are inadvertent and generally unavoidable. However,
DEWs would be directed at individuals for the purpose of causing an effect. Rapid
changes in technology resulting from ongoing research quickly adds more complexities
to the ethics debate. There are ongoing tests of optogenetics on mice that have shown
light delivery technology can manipulate their brain cell function. Such a weapon would
certainly have legal and ethical implications if directed against humans (Leins, 2016).
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2.1.5 Today’s DEWs
There are several weapons either currently in use or that have been tested and
fielded that can be classified as DEWs. They are split between two of the most prominent
directed energy technologies: high-energy lasers (HELs) and high-powered microwaves
(HPMs) (Sanyal, Bevington, & Brigham, 2017). Since lasers are already used by the
military for a variety of purposes, HELs emerged as leading contender for DEWs. HELs
extend the capability of existing lasers by essentially increasing the power ranges to
achieve more effects. The four main approaches to HELs are solid-state, fiber, chemical,
and free electron (Sanyal et al., 2017), which are all infrared. HPMs, on the other hand,
use microwave or radio-wave frequency ranges. These offer some of the same benefits of
HELs such as active denial and other non-lethal effects. Scaled up in power, the same
beam can be used in a lethal capacity (Sanyal et al., 2017).
The Active Denial System (ADS) is a non-lethal, counter-personnel, vehicle
mounted system created by Raytheon. Antal (2013) describes the system as one of the
first such systems fielded by the Army. Tested and shown to have a range of
approximately one mile, the ADS directs a high frequency beam of 95GHz waves at a
person or group of people. The energy is invisible to the target person or group and
causes intense uncomfortableness within a few seconds by way of heating the skin. In
this manner, targets are obliged to leave the area. Throughout rigorous testing, the system
was shown to be non-lethal, but there are still doubts as to the effects over a longer time.
Antal (2013) also notes the ADS’s fielding in Afghanistan with the Army in 2010, even
though it was never used. In a 2012 demonstration, the Marines seemed to embrace the
ADS more than the Army.
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A design of experiments was conducted to test the methodology for the
effectiveness of non-lethal weapons in a crowd scenario. The experiment showed a longrange DEW suppressed the crowd the most. Through the breadth of the experiment, the
long-range DEW showed statistically significant differences on all measures of
effectiveness (Mezzacappa et al., 2017). However, the authors noted that the experiment
results should not be used to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of any particular
weapon type as the experiment focused on the methodology.
The Mobile Experimental High Energy Laser (MEHEL) is Stryker mounted
mobile testbed to support the Army’s laser programs (Pina, 2017). Pina further describes
the MEHEL as a 5kW system designed to defeat small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS)
threats. Its $30 per shot cost is calculated by the amount of diesel fuel needed to power
the shot. In 2017, the latest version of the MEHEL operated from a combat vehicle
successfully defeated a sUAS. A potential use for the MEHEL is defeating sUAS
swarms, although more testing is needed.
One DEW system has been operationalized aboard the USS Ponce in the Persian
Gulf (Coffey, 2014). The Laser Weapon System (LaWS) was installed on the ship in
2014 and has been tested and used aboard ever since. The DEW was designed to be
operated by a single sailor using a controller similar to the ones found on the Xbox and
PlayStation game systems (Coffey, 2014). Coffey (2014) also explains how the LaWS
integrates six solid-state infrared beams, which can be modified from low to high power
for warning or target destruction. The system is mounted on a pre-existing Phalanx gun
system, thus removing the need for an entirely new platform and tracking system
(Gunzinger & Dougherty, 2012).
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2.1.6 Tomorrow’s DEWs
Other DEWs are still in the development process as engineers work to improve
previous systems while learning from their failures and successes. The engineers and
their military customers are working to synchronize technological feasibility with mission
need. This effort goes hand-in-hand with the military’s analysis of the changing threats
and where they see DEWs fitting into the equation.
The HEL systems mentioned earlier are universally confined by their size,
weight, and power consumption (SWaP) limitations (Coffey, 2014). In response to these
limitations, a Dayton, OH based company, Optonicus, developed an optical phased array
for the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). This array was
made specifically for DARPA’s Excalibur program and featured low power
requirements, long-range turbulence correction, and scalability. The system was tested
and shown to compensate for atmospheric aberrations. However, the most intriguing
aspect was the system’s ability to do so in a package 10 times lighter and more compact
than previous HELs (Coffey, 2014).
The DEW programs mentioned thus far offer warfighters capabilities different
than those currently in their arsenal. However, an ongoing issue is matching those
capabilities to operational requirements (Stoudt, 2012). The gap between engineers and
operators often prevents DEWs from being fully utilized, even when fielded. Staying
with this theme, a lack of formal requirements has created a situation where the
technology is pushed by the developers rather than pulled by the operators (Stoudt,
2012).
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Some of the suggested missions for DEWs have not changed much over the years.
Others are being realized as well-suited for DEW. These missions include defending
infrastructure such as power plants, performing non-lethal engagements like crowd
control, and attacking targets in an urban environment (Zimet & Mann, 2009). As warfare
evolves and the threat scenarios change, DEWs with a lower power output could possibly
be used alongside conventional weapons. This is a shift from the elusive 100kWh HEL
often talked about as the goal for laser DEWs (Zimet & Mann, 2009). Welch et al. (2007)
suggests there is not much reason to continue trying to field high-powered lasers until the
operational demands generate priorities. Likewise, they suggest that fragmented efforts in
science and technology projects should move to specific research and development
programs that can lead to fielded systems.
2.2

Acquisition Programs
Military acquisition is more than just purchasing an item. Acquisition is a broader

term that covers the process to design, engineer, construct, test, deploy, and sustain an
item (Schwartz, 2014). The entire process is sometimes described as long and arduous
because it must follow statutes and regulations laid out to ensure such processes have
well-defined structure and accountability. A weapon system must go through three steps:
identifying a required need, establishing a budget, and acquiring the system (Schwartz,
2014). The entire acquisition process has been lambasted numerous times for being slow,
overly bureaucratic, and ineffective. Despite discussions to overhaul the process, it
remains essentially unchanged. Schwartz (2014) does an excellent job summarizing the
acquisitions process and much of the following paragraphs are attributed to his work.
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2.2.1 Identifying a Requirement
In 2003, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) was
created as a new process to identify, assess, and prioritize which capabilities the military
requires. This new process was a shift in approaches from threat-based to capabilitiesbased. In short, needed capabilities were identified to fit priorities based on high-level
strategy and guidance documents such as the National Defense Strategy. The previous
process developed and fielded systems based on perceived threats to the nation. A
primary reason for making the change was to develop systems that could be used jointly
so unnecessary time and money was not spent on separate systems that filled the same
capabilities gap.
2.2.2 Budgeting
The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system is an
annual process that aims to work within fiscal constraints to provide a mix of forces,
equipment, manpower, and support. The planning stage is where the national defense
strategy is laid out and priorities for programs are developed. The programming stage is
where missions and objectives of weapons programs are submitted, along with a
proposed budget. The budgeting stage occurs simultaneously but separately from the
actual program proposals. Once a program decision is made or a budget review is
conducted, the budget decision is issued. Finally, the execution stage takes place. In this
stage, programs are evaluated against metrics, including funding obligations.
2.2.3 Acquisition
The Defense Acquisition System is a general framework that is intended to work
with all manner of programs, from missiles, to information technology, to vehicles and
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weapon systems. Program development times are not uniform and vary greatly (Van Atta,
2013). Scheduling is often overly ambitious or unrealistic given the nature of the
technology within the program. DEWs fall prey to this situation due to the complex
nature and employment of the technology involved. Major systems development takes an
average of seven to ten years (Van Atta, 2013).
2.2.4 Evaluation of Acquisition Programs
All programs must meet specific requirements throughout the process to continue
to the subsequent phase. These are known as Milestone A, B, and C. Milestone A
happens pre-systems acquisition and initiates technology maturation and risk reduction.
Milestone B happens at the end of pre-systems acquisition directly before the start of
systems acquisition and initiates engineering and manufacturing development. Milestone
C initiates production and deployments and occurs during systems acquisition.
Acquisition is broken into five phases: materiel solution analysis, technology maturation
and risk reduction, engineering and manufacturing development, production and
deployment, and operations and support. Figure 3 shows the interaction between the
milestones and phases.
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Figure 3. Acquisition Phases and Milestones (Defense Acquisition University, 2017)

The three milestones determine if a program has met the exit requirements of the
current phase and can continue to the next phase. Formal evaluation standards are not
spelled out due to the differing nature of unlike programs. Instead, each program manager
and Milestone Decision Authority are given the brunt of the task to ensure developmental
test and evaluation people have adequately evaluated their program (Defense Acquisition
University, 2017). This research can be used to fill the void when looking at the HSI
portion of a DEW acquisition program.
2.3

Human Systems Integration
According to the Air Force HSI Handbook, “HSI is the process by which to

design and develop systems that effectively and affordably integrate human capabilities
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and limitations” (Department of the Air Force, 2009). Similarly, Air Force Instruction 631201 defines HSI as, “A disciplined, unified, and interactive systems engineering
approach to integrate human considerations into system development, design, and
lifecycle management to improve total system performance and reduce costs of
ownership” (Department of the Air Force, 2007). In both cases and throughout various
other organizations’ definitions, HSI boils down to seamlessly meshing human and
system for better performance and reduced costs. HSI covers a wide range of factors that
the Air Force divides into nine domains: manpower, personnel, training (MPT), human
factors engineering, environment, safety, occupational health (ESOH), survivability, and
habitability. The HSI domains are defined with liberal help from the HSI Domain Guide
(Carr & Greene, 2009a).
Manpower: The manpower domain addresses both the number and type of
personnel required. It covers the occupational specialties (may be multiple specialties)
needed to train, operate, maintain, and support the developed system. The domain ties in
with other domains in its pursuit of engineering designs that optimize the use of
manpower for the purpose of keeping human resource costs within reason. The
determination of manpower levels and their associated positions must also account for the
cognitive, physical, and physiological demands on humans. Considerations must be made
for the technological impact possibilities on humans integrated into a system. Human
resources is a related but not identical field.
Personnel: The personnel domain addresses all things a human is required to
possess to operate, maintain, and support the system. This includes their knowledge,
skills, and abilities (KSAs); experience; and aptitudes. Human aptitudes include such
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things as cognitive, physical, and sensory capabilities. The domain also considers the
means to recruit and retain the people. Systems requirements drive recruitment, testing,
qualification, and selection. The personnel domain works by defining human
performance characteristics and then determining target populations for select
occupational specialties. This includes the management of said occupational specialties
for career progression and assignments. The domain can impact both manpower and
training. The domain can also act as a driving force for design requirements. Like the
manpower domain, human resources is a related but not identical field. Human resources
can be thought of an overarching domain that contains both manpower and personnel.
Training: The training domain addresses all resources and instruction required to
provide personnel (identified in the personnel domain) with the KSAs to operate,
maintain, and support the system. This includes both individual and collective training, as
well as both qualification training and proficiency training. Emphasis should be placed on
training options that enhance the population’s capabilities, maintain skills, are
comparatively fast, and use an optimal mix of training resources. All training systems and
materials should be developed concurrently with the system. The fielding of the training
system may be required prior to the actual system so personnel can operate, maintain, and
support the system when it is fielded.
Human Factors Engineering (HFE, referred to in this research simply as Human
Factors): The human factors domain involves the understanding and integration of human
capabilities into system design. Human capabilities include cognitive, physical, sensory,
and team dynamic. The integration must take place at the onset of the system design and
continue through system disposal. The main goal is to effectively integrate the human-
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system interfaces so system performance can be optimized. System functions should be
designed with a comprehensive human factors analysis so system requirements and
functions align. Human factors account for increasingly complex technology and the
demands on people. Human factors increase usability for system users by minimizing
design characteristics that lead to errors. The domain also helps to eliminate the need for
design work-arounds.
Environment: The environment domain considers the relationships that exist
between all living things and systems with water, land, air, space, cyberspace, markets,
and organizations. A goal is to protect the environment from system design,
manufacturing, operations, sustainment, and disposal activities. These considerations
could affect the concept of operations and requirements.
Safety: The safety domain promotes design characteristics that directly affect the
potential for death or injury to operators, maintainers, and support personnel in the form
of reduced accidents or mishaps. In the same vein, the design characteristics reduce the
potential for cascading failures within the system and in other systems. Lessons learned
from previous systems are heavily utilized so design features prevent hazards where
possible and minimize risk where prevention is unattainable. Redundant systems are key,
as are systems that alert the user when a problem exists. Systems that assist in avoiding
and recovering from errors are also part of the safety domain. A few examples of
widespread issues are: factors that threaten the safe operation of the system; walking and
working surfaces; pressure extremes; and control of hazardous energy releases such as
mechanical, electrical, fluids under pressure, ionizing or non-ionizing radiation, fire, and
explosions.
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Occupational Health: The occupational health domain enhances job performance
of operators, maintainers, and support personnel by promoting system design features
that minimize the risk of injury, acute or chronic illness, and disability. When health
hazards cannot be avoided, the domain recommends personal protective equipment,
protective enclosures, or mitigation measures. Some common issues include noise,
chemical exposures, atmospheric hazards like oxygen deficiency, vibration, and both
ionizing and non-ionizing radiation. Additionally, there are human factors to be
considered that could result in chronic disease or discomfort. An example is repetitive
motion injuries.
Survivability: The survivability domain helps reduce injury and loss of the
system. Any characteristic that enables the total system to be less susceptible to mission
degradation or termination, injury or loss of life to users, or partial or complete loss of the
system and its components is part of survivability. Some characteristics include life
support, body armor, helmets, plating, egress/ejection equipment, air bags, seat belts, and
electronic shielding. These concerns must be addressed with the total concept of
operations in mind and for all users, operators, maintainers, and support personnel.
Habitability: The habitability domain covers system working and living
conditions. Some examples are lighting, ventilation, adequate space, vibration, noise, and
temperature control, as well as the availability of medical care, food and/or drink
services, suitable sleeping quarters, sanitation, and personal hygiene facilities. These
types of characteristics are necessary for personnel and impact recruitment and retention
(personnel domain). Overall system performance is influenced by its personnel and their
level of morale, motivation, quality of life, safety, health, and comfort.
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2.3.1 Importance of HSI
Failure to address HSI concerns at the inception of the systems engineering
process causes HSI attributes to not be deeply implemented in the systems engineering
process (Bodenhamer, 2012). This may seem like a trivial point, until compared with a
typical system’s life-cycle cost as shown in Figure 4. As depicted, the cost to change
design direction [or implement additional HSI measures] increases significantly as the
process moves forward. In other words, the life-cycle cost of a system is essentially
locked in early in the process, thereby making it difficult to change anything moving
forward past the original design. This contrasts with the actual system costs (lower curve)
that rise much slower over time. Both curves eventually meet at the end of the life-cycle,
meaning much of the life-cycle cost is realized near the end of the useful life of the
system. Onkham et al. (2012) recognized the need to address human factors, one of the
HSI domains, to produce desired outputs on costs associated with human capability,
human reliability, and decision making. Addressing these factors at the beginning of a
process reduces risk, uncertainty, and total ownership cost (TOC).
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Figure 4. Life Cycle Cost Impacts from Early Phase Decision-Making (adapted) from the
Systems Engineering Handbook, Volume 3.1 (as cited in Silva-Martinez, 2016)

2.3.1.1 Case Study 1: HSI Lessons Learned from UAVs
Tvaryanas et al. (2005) found that 60.2% of UAV mishaps involved human
factors. The study looked at 221 UAV mishaps categorized by the DoD’s mishap
classifications (Department of Defense, 2011). The mishaps totaled more than $151.5
million in damages (Feltman, Curry, & Kelley, 2018), in today’s dollars. The study
recognized the “tendency to consider complex systems as “technology” driven rather than
“people-technology” driven. Improvement of technology generally means more complex
systems, which increases the chance for failures associated with both human and
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mechanical causes. They highlight a case study on UAVs that calls attention to the
UAVs’ high mishap rate as compared to general aviation. Comparing the 32 mishaps per
100,000 flight hours of the Air Force’s RQ-1 Predator to general aviation’s 1 mishap per
100,000 flight hours shows that UAV reliability is orders of magnitude worse than
general aviation. It could be argued that a higher mishap rate for an unmanned vehicle is
less important than a manned vehicle because of the absence of a human pilot being
affected by the mishap. However, the DoD recognizes “the reliability and sustainability
of UAVs is vitally important because it underlies their affordability (an acquisition issue),
their mission availability (an operations and logistics issue), and their acceptance into
civil airspace (a regulatory issue)” (Defense Science Board, 2004). Table 1 shows the
summary of UAV mishaps by human factors taxonomies.

Table 1. Summary of Prior UAV Mishap Studies Using
Standardized Human Factors Taxonomies (Tvaryanas et al., 2005)
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Tvaryanas et al. (2005) uses data from Table 1 combined with their own analysis
to gain several insights into the role of human factors in UAV mishaps. Figure 5 uses the
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) to display human causal
factors of UAV mishaps. The highest percentage of mishaps were due to organizational
influences. This could possibly be traced back to the initial phases of development when
HSI could have played a role in shaping the design of and training for the system.

Figure 5. Top Level HFACS Human Causal Factors by Military Service as Percentage of
Total Mishaps (Tvaryanas et al., 2005)

Of note, the organizational influences category includes resource/acquisition
management and was the most frequent type of latent failure, present in 79.4% of human
causal factors mishaps in the Air Force (Tvaryanas et al., 2005). Tvaryanas et al. (2005)
“summarizes the root categories of acts as a percentage of the total acts by service” in
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Figure 6, where it can be seen that the Air Force has a higher percentage (47.2%) of skillbased errors than the other services.

Figure 6. Root Categories of Acts as Percentage of Total Acts by Service (Tvaryanas et
al., 2005)

Figure 7 shows UAV mishaps by the more familiar HSI domains. The human
factors domain easily outpaced all other domains as containing the most mishaps. Within
human factors, 60% of Air Force mishaps involved organizational interfaces failures
(Tvaryanas et al., 2005). Tvaryanas (2005) notes the consistent findings showing a higher
frequency of Air Force mishaps can be traced directly to acquisition failures tied to
subsystem component reliability problems.
“The excessive numbers of mechanical failures analyzed in the UAV
Reliability Study are physical manifestations of a recurring latent failure in
the acquisitions process. To effectively address current UAV mishap rates
and safeguard investments in future UAV systems, the investigational
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spotlight must move from mechanical failures as the cause of UAV mishaps
to failures in the organizational culture, management, or structure of DoD’s
acquisition processes for UAVs.” (Tvaryanas et al., 2005)

Figure 7. HSI Domains/Interfaces by Service as Percentage
of Total Mishaps (Tvaryanas et al., 2005)

2.3.1.2 Case Study 2: HSI Success Story of F119 Engine
When Lockheed won the initial $13.7 billion [in today’s dollars] contract in 1991
(Donley v. Lockheed Martin Corp, 2010) to develop the next-generation stealth fighter,
the F-22, the Secretary of the Air Force noted one reason was due to its superior engines
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(Bolkcom, 2007). A reason for the increased attention to engines was the F-15’s F100
engine service record. Although high performing, the F100 was prone to failure and the
resulting downtime needed for maintenance (Liu et al., 2010). The Air Force
subsequently implemented the Reliability, Maintainability, and Sustainability (RM&S)
program in 1984, soon after work began developing the F-22. Pratt & Whitney,
developers of the F119 engine, realized the importance of this program and pushed to use
HSI as a way to make their engine more reliable.
Seven of the nine HSI domains were represented by organizations within Pratt &
Whitney (Liu et al., 2010). The Chief Engineer of the F119, Frank Gillette, was the
driving force behind the incorporation of HSI principles, which in turn led to adherence
to the Air Force’s RM&S program. It took constant leadership intervention and
adherence to policies to move forward with development of the engine while maintaining
an eye on both RM&S and HSI.
The competition between Pratt & Whitney and General Electric to develop the F22’s engine was eventually won by Pratt & Whitney. After both companies were awarded
money to continue their development, Pratt & Whitney chose to devote double the test
hours as General Electric, with an emphasis on meeting the RM&S guidelines. General
Electric ended up developing a superior engine in terms of performance while Pratt &
Whitney had a slightly less performance-based engine that more closely aligned to
RM&S through the use of HSI (Liu et al., 2010).
The integration of RM&S into Pratt & Whitney’s development process showed
that even separate organizations working together could successfully consider and apply
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HSI. Liu et al. (2010) identified three factors as key to the success of HSI within systems
engineering of the F119 program:
1. Air Force policy to elevate the visibility of HSI
2. Pratt & Whitney’s willingness to internalize HSI
practices and enforce accountability for HSI
3. The integration of HSI and systems engineering in the
early phases of the acquisition life cycle
The fact that HSI considerations were coupled with other systems engineering practices
was a strength of the project. The lack of a centralized “HSI group” did not detract from
the project’s goal of meeting Air Force requirements of RM&S (Liu et al., 2010).
2.3.2 HSI Implementation
Airbus Defense and Space looked at their current enterprise architecture
philosophy and realized it did not provide sufficient weight to the human aspects of
existing architectures or to proposed changes to current products. The resulting
investigation prompted integrating more HSI (areas that were not covered by their
existing human view architecture) into different areas of their model based system
engineering process (Sharples, 2015). A different study integrated HSI concepts,
specifically human factors, in the early design stages of a nuclear main control room. It
recognized the importance of correctly identifying and implementing high-level
requirements early in the design to avoid continual updates (Yan, Habiyaremye, Wei, &
Tran, 2017).
Looking past successful uses of integrating the human factors domain of HSI into
developing better functioning systems, there have also been studies on the research-
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practice gap. This is the gap that exists when practitioners or operators do not heed the
recommendations of researchers on the subject. Specifically reviewing human factors, the
study showed journal publications over the last 50 years have shown an increase in the
number of articles that use theory. There is evidence that the research-practice gap is
shrinking, yet still present (Chung & Williamson, 2017).
2.4

Decision Analysis Using VFT
Parnell et al. (2013) introduces, defines, and explains decision analysis and VFT

in depth within Handbook of Decision Analysis. At its core, they state that decision
analysis is “a philosophy and social-technical process to create value for decision-makers
and stakeholders facing difficult decisions involving multiple stakeholders, multiple
(possibly conflicting) objectives, complex alternatives, important uncertainties, and
significant consequences.” They continue by saying that VFT is a “philosophical
approach to the analysis of decisions” that creates decision-making opportunities by
using the value to generate better alternatives. Keeney (1992) refers to VFT as thinking
that focuses first on values and later on alternatives that might achieve them. This is in
contrast to alternative-focused thinking (AFT), which compares available alternatives.
Parnell et al. (2013) notes that a decision is “an irrevocable allocation of resources.”
From the stated definitions, it can be seen that VFT can be used by decision-makers to
allocate resources effectively.
Although not utilized in this research, a key component of VFT allows decisionmakers to generate alternatives, as opposed to only comparing pre-existing alternatives.
For example, a decision-maker would be able to choose the best alternative given A, B,
and C. However, if A, B, and C are the only choices, the decision-maker can never do
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better than the best of those choices. VFT lets the decision-maker see those alternatives
and analyze hybrids of those alternatives to generate new alternatives. Now, given A, B,
C, and D, the decision-maker could choose D, whereas before that was not an option.
Kirkwood (1996) defines decision analysis slightly differently. A decision implies
the existence of alternatives. Significant decisions result in differing outcomes and the
more diverse the outcomes, the more complex the analysis (Kirkwood, 1996). Decision
analysis is a process used to create value for decision-makers (DM) faced with difficult
decisions that have complex alternatives, more than one objective, and substantial
consequences. It must be noted that good decisions can have bad outcomes. Even a
decision made logically and consistent with the DM’s preferences may have a bad
outcome, just like a poor decision process can sometimes lead to a good outcome (Parnell
et al., 2013). One way to conduct decision analysis is through the use of VFT.
The VFT approach uses quantitative measures to give each alternative a score. In
this way, alternatives can be numerically ranked against each other. A value hierarchy is
used to organize evaluation considerations. These areas of concern are structured in such
a way so they feed into each other from bottom to top.
The 10-step process summarized in Figure 8 is usually employed to use VFT
(Shoviak, 2001). Step 1, problem identification, involves clearly defining the problem
within the correct frame, perspective, and scope. Step 2, identify and structure objectives,
is where the DM’s values are represented in the value hierarchy. This information can
come directly from the DM (platinum standard), official documents (gold standard), or
from representatives of the DM (silver standard). Platinum standard is preferred over
gold, which is preferred over silver. Step 3, measure the achievement of objectives, is the
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process of creating evaluation measures to garner a raw score. Step 4, single attribute
value function (SAVF), uses the evaluation measures of step 3 to define a function that
converts raw numbers to a value score. Step 5, multi attribute value function (MAVF),
adds a weight to each evaluation measure so it can be compared with every other
evaluation measure with the DM’s corresponding preferences. Step 6, alternative
generation and screening, finds or generates alternatives that will be scored in step 7,
alternative scoring. Alternative scores are computed by multiplying value scores by their
weight. Step 8, deterministic analysis, and step 9, sensitivity analysis, are used to evaluate
each alternative’s results. Lastly, step 10, communicating results, allows the analyst to
share the results with the DM.

Step 1. Problem Identification
Step 2. Identify & Structure Objectives
Step 3. Measure the Achievement of Objectives
Step 4. Single Attribute Value Function
Step 5. Multi Attribute Value Function
Step 6. Alternative Generation
Step 7. Alternative Scoring
Step 8. Deterministic Analysis
Step 9. Sensitivity Analysis
Step 10. Communicating Results
Figure 8. VFT Steps (Shoviak, 2001)

2.4.1 Case Study: Foundations 2025
In the late 1990s, a study was directed by the Air Force Chief of Staff called Air
Force 2025. The more than year-long study’s goal was to identify system concepts and
technologies for the United States Air Force to achieve air and space dominance by the
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year 2025. A VFT model named Foundations 2025 was used successfully to score 43
system concepts (Parnell, Conley, Jackson, Lehmkuhl, & Andrew, 1998).
Parnell et al.’s (1998) study was split into four phases: preparation, idea
generation, assimilation, and operations analysis. An introduction to VFT and its uses
was provided to all the study participants during the preparation phase. Idea generation
brought system concepts and assimilation identified requirements for the concepts and
determined which concepts met those requirements. The final phase was conducted
concurrently with the previous three phases. The model itself was used to evaluate the
final system concepts.
The search for gold standard documents proved insufficient in detail to create a
value hierarchy so the silver standard approach was used instead. The investigating team
asked participants to identify tasks needed to provide air and space dominance by 2025.
Affinity diagrams were used to group similar verbs (tasks), which were then structured
further. Using the affinity diagram, tasks were sorted separately by participants. Next,
tasks were analyzed to determine duplicates, combined when needed, and further
categorized into subtasks, tasks, and functions.
Parnell et al.’s (1998) team spent considerable time determining attributes and
evaluation measures for each subtask. The attributes described a system’s ability to
accomplish a subtask while the evaluation measures quantified system performance.
Operational experts were used to develop the SAVFs and determine weights. The study
itself also identified six alternate futures of the state of the Earth to take into account
differing possible requirements in the future. To account for this in the model, the teams
involved in the study independently submitted weights for each alternate future. The
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average weight for each future was used in the model. Operational analysis and
technology teams then scored each system concept, which resulted in a full list of concept
systems ranked against one another.
The model successfully used VFT as a methodology and proved to be effective
for a large scale, complex, and long-term planning horizon problem. The five tier, 134
evaluation measure model objectively analyzed future system concepts and avoided
institutional bias. It proves VFT can be used for concept systems or programs.
2.4.2 Experts
This research for this thesis relied heavily on experts, who are different than
novices and other nonexperts. Experts do not necessarily have more ability than a novice;
they simply have more specialized knowledge (Proctor & Van Zandt, 2008). An expert
can be described as someone who has special knowledge of a specific domain such as
HSI or DEWs. Chi et al. (1981) details expert characteristics in Table 2. As detailed in
the table, experts are not shown to have greater abilities than a novice. Instead, they are
able to draw upon their specific knowledge of a subject and perform better when working
with subject specific problems or tasks.

Table 2. Characteristics of Expert Performance (Chi et al., 1981)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

Experts excel mainly in their domains.
Experts perceive large meaningful patterns in their domain.
Experts are fast; they are faster than novices at performing the skills
of their domain, and they quickly solve problems with little error.
Experts have superior short-term and long-term memory for material
in their domain.
Experts see and represent a problem in their domain at a deeper (more
principled) level than novices; novices tend to represent a problem at
a superficial level.
Experts spend a great deal of time analyzing a problem qualitatively.
Experts have more accurate self-monitoring skills.
Experts are good at selecting the most appropriate strategies to use in
a situation.
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2.4.3 Tacit Knowledge
Another aspect of experts is their tacit knowledge. Objective knowledge can be
thought of as knowledge that can be readily communicated and understood. Tacit
knowledge is the opposite, and it is often difficult or impossible to communicate. Other
characteristics of tacit knowledge are that it is highly individualized, practical, and
specific (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2001). For the expert possessing tacit knowledge, their
thought process goes through steps that the expert themselves may be unable to articulate.
It is such an engrained piece of knowledge that the expert is unable to completely define
or articulate their thought process, thus meeting the definition of tacit knowledge. Tacit
knowledge is not restricted to experts only; novices and anyone in between possess it
(Balu & Anchalia, 2015).
2.4.4 Value Hierarchy as a Knowledge Repository
There are different ways to store knowledge for subsequent use. A value
hierarchy created from the first two steps of the VFT process is a way to store domainspecific knowledge. Knowledge management is a central aspect to many firms’ long-term
competitive strategies and the same goes for the military. Improved overall performance
and utilization of competitive advantages are two benefits of good knowledge
management. Defined as “the explicit and systematic management of vital knowledge –
and its associated processes of creation, organization, diffusion, use and exploitation”
(Skyrme, 2001), a knowledge base is inherently linked to knowledge management. A
value hierarchy essentially acts as a repository for knowledge that can assist experts and
non-experts alike in making good decisions about a particular issue. The tacit knowledge
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contained in a value hierarchy “can be a source of advantage because it is unique,
imperfectly mobile, imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable” (López-Nicolás &
Meroño-Cerdán, 2011).
Multiple examples of HSI in various acquisition programs were discussed in the
literature review. The need for innovation and DEWs as a part of the military’s strategic
plan and the acquisition process were also covered. Decision analysis using VFT was
recommended as a way to transfer knowledge specific to an HSI and DEW expert to a
non-expert. The expert’s knowledge can then be used without the expert being present
and a DEW acquisition program can be evaluated in terms of HSI content. This enables a
new team member or person unfamiliar with the inner workings of such a system to step
in a use the model as a tool to evaluation their input to the program.
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III. Methodology

It is evident that program managers and the human systems integration (HSI)
experts themselves face a challenge in balancing total system costs, capabilities, and
functionality. While the HSI expert is not necessarily responsible for cost, they are not
excluded from finding reasonable solutions to incorporate the needed HSI aspects into the
system. Logically, too high a cost without the added benefit will result in certain HSI
aspects not being incorporated into the system. The result would be at best, degraded
performance, or at worst, a system that did not function properly due to human and
machine not working together appropriately. Value-focused thinking (VFT) is a suitable
methodology to evaluate this multi-criteria decision analysis problem because it is good
with complex, multi-faceted problems.
This chapter will discuss VFT, the types of knowledge gathered, how to choose
an expert, elicitation techniques, and interactions with the expert. Next, the how-to of the
VFT process will be discussed as it relates to DEW acquisition programs and HSI. The
primary focus of the chapter is knowledge elicitation methods and the application of
decision analysis (DA) techniques.
3.1

Value Focused Thinking
Multi-objective decision analysis combines multiple objectives and values and

scores alternatives against each other, giving decision-makers (DMs) the opportunity to
evaluate each alternative objectively. The core of VFT is first understanding your
objectives and then figuring out how to achieve them (Keeney, 1992). Much of the
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information contained within a hierarchy comes from an expert or a decision-maker. The
process of eliciting values and objectives from the decision-maker is a key part of VFT.
A primary reason for using VFT is the allowance for alternative creation by using
trade-offs between value and weights. The allowance for alternative creation can come in
especially handy when faced with specific problems that may have limited scope to begin
with. This research is on HSI within DEW acquisition programs, which can immediately
be constrained by a size component. For example, a DEW system needs space not only
for the weapon system, but the operator as well. The whole system must be examined to
determine which platforms could be viable candidates to host such a system. In any case,
there is a minimum amount of space needed for the weapon system as well as operator
area. The value hierarchy was built with this kind of constraint in mind.
Works by both Keeney (1992) and Parnell (2013) were used to explain the
remainder of this section. Initially, identifying or framing the problem is the key to
moving forward with the model. Incorrect framing can lead to answering the wrong
question or otherwise overlooking key aspects of the problem. This in turn makes it
harder for a decision-maker to make a good decision based on the model. Upon
determining the correct frame, objectives are structured into the value hierarchy, which is
essentially the heart of VFT. Decision-makers and any other stakeholders must agree in
principal on the hierarchy as it is the basis for the scoring of alternatives and the end
decision. The visualization of the model through the hierarchy is another benefit of VFT.
Like a pyramid or tree, the strategic objective is the uppermost tier and branching out
below it are the fundamental objectives, or lower tiers. Finally, the fundamental
objectives are broken down until the objective can be measured.

44

Generally, the VFT process goes sequentially through the 10-step process
beginning with problem identification and ending with analysis and recommendations.
The methodology used here was modified based on lack of an actual DEW acquisition
program to use as inputs. Steps 6-10 were not completed as a result.
3.2

Knowledge Elicitation
The VFT process does not work without a strong knowledge source. Whether it

be the platinum, gold, or silver standard, something must provide the basis for the
creation of the value hierarchy. The model created used almost exclusively platinum and
gold sources, lending to its validity. This research used one primary decision-maker who
was also the subject matter expert (SME). The SME was knowledgeable on the inner
workings of DEWs, the acquisition process, and HSI. There were some small gaps in
knowledge as the SME was more familiar with some domains of HSI and slightly less
familiar with others. The combination of DEW, HSI, and acquisition process expertise
proved vital to the research. Having a single source for the three knowledge sets helped
later in the process to determine what was important. A second SME was brought in
midway through the research to provide additional input and perspective. The second
SME shared the same knowledge base, albeit from a different background. As such, the
two SMEs provided varying perspectives while fundamentally agreeing on all major
aspects of the research.
3.2.1 Tacit vs Explicit Knowledge
Obtaining explicit knowledge, or the kind of knowledge that can be codified and
written down, is inherently easier than obtaining tacit knowledge. By its very definition,
tacit knowledge cannot be easily obtained or written down. The collection and
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codification of tacit knowledge essentially transforms the knowledge from tacit to
explicit.
In the context of the research, explicit knowledge was the primary source of
information. However, the SMEs had years of experience that in and of itself lent
credence to the assertion that the SMEs possessed tacit knowledge. Bad or otherwise
incomplete knowledge can significantly affect the ability of the VFT model to function
properly and provide useful results.
3.2.2 Choosing the Expert
This research was developed by a sponsoring agency, the 711th Human
Performance Wing (HPW), with an individual in mind to act as the lead. While often
times the decision-maker is chosen by virtue of their position within the organization, this
is not always the case with experts. The primary sponsor of this research also served as
decision-maker and expert. Pace (as cited in Lavin et al., 2007) uses the Department of
Defense’s definition to describe a subject matter expert (SME) as “an individual who, by
virtue of position, education, training, or experience, is expected to have greater-thannormal expertise or insight relative to a particular technical or operational discipline,
system, or process, and who has been selected or appointed to participate in development,
verification, validation, accreditation, or use of a model or simulation.” The sponsor fits
this definition by virtue of all four descriptors in the Department of Defense’s definition.
He is a retired Air Force Colonel (O-6) currently working in a Scientist & Engineer
position at an O-5 equivalent level as a Human Systems Integration Consultant. His
education includes a Doctor of Optometry, PhD in Physiological Optics, and an HSI
certificate. His served 22 years on active duty with various positions relating to
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optometry, lasers, vision, and HSI. In total, he has 18+ years working on HSI issues with
five years having a direct influence on acquisition programs. The various assignments,
education, and skills gained over the years have given him more than enough pedigree to
be called an expert.
3.2.3 Knowledge Elicitation Technique
There are many methods to eliciting knowledge, each with their own advantages
and disadvantages (Proctor & Van Zandt, 2008). Although all the methods are too
numerous to discuss here, several were considered for use. Interviews, case studies,
protocols, observation, sorting, and document analysis were all considered as viable
approaches. However, observation was ruled out due to time constraints and lack of a
specific ongoing DEW acquisition program to observe. Case studies were ruled out due
to lack of published literature on the specific subject. Finally, the well-known and
popular technique of expert interviews was chosen as the primary knowledge elicitation
technique.
Related to interviews is the verbal protocol analysis method, which differs from
interviews in that the expert reports their thought process for a particular task instead of
answering a series of questions. Hoffman et al. (2006) conducted a series of studies that
showed both think-aloud problem solving combined with protocol analysis and
unstructured interviews were time consuming and had a low yield of less than one
informative proposition per minute. The most efficient methods yielded between one and
two informative propositions per minute and included structured interviews, a
constrained processing task, and analysis of tough cases.
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The interview technique was chosen as the knowledge elicitation approach
because the SMEs were busy working their jobs and had limited time. Also, the small
number of participants in the research (one person, later doubled to two people) ruled out
other elicitation techniques such as focus groups. A survey, although feasible for portions
of developing the model, was deemed too restrictive. Surveys tend to confine answers to
a narrow scope and a wider lens was needed to gather the needed information. The
interview process worked well when combined partially with other techniques like
sorting and document analysis.
A semi-structured interview was used for knowledge elicitation from the experts.
The semi-structured interview was chosen in part due to Hoffman’s (2006) assertion that
structured provides better results than unstructured. This technique allowed for more
varied responses and avoids close-ended questions. In this particular case, the experts
also happened to be the decision-makers, which was another reason the semi-structured
approach was used. In many instances, decision-makers may be managers or supervisors
who work exclusively in the role of overseeing others. They may not hold a high degree
of knowledge on the particular subject and often rely on the expertise of others. This was
not the case in this research, and it helped speed the process of creating the value
hierarchy.
The semi-structured approach worked because multiple, identical interviews did
not need to be conducted over time as in a structured interview. Likewise, having no
questions prepared in advance did not make sense as in an unstructured interview. The
semi-structured interview was a good balance between the two. It allowed for a partially

48

formalized interaction between researcher and SME where a few constructed questions
could generate further discussion on a subject.
3.2.4 Expert Interactions
Research into DEWs and the acquisition process was conducted before ever
meeting with the expert. This was a vital piece of the pre-interview process to obtain
credibility as a researcher and provide a base from which to formulate questions and
guide the discussion. Five scheduled interviews were conducted over the course of the
research, which lasted approximately seven months total. Each meeting was scheduled
for one hour and opened with an explanation of the reason for the interview. Care was
taken during each interview to distinguish between facts, opinions, and assumptions. In
working through a semi-structured interview process, four to six questions were prepared
beforehand with additional questions asked based on the answers. This technique led to
open discussions and allowed for the free flow of information and knowledge.
The first meeting happened early on and was meant as a “meet and greet”
between researcher and expert. It served as a starting point for reconciling scholarly
research and expert knowledge. Subsequent interviews progressed through the VFT steps.
Interviews four and five saw the inclusion of a second expert. The combined knowledge
and inputs of both SMEs enhanced the information being provided. Although the lack of
a larger group of stakeholders could be thought of as detrimental to the process, it
actually provided an opportunity to quickly come to decisions regarding the creation of
the hierarchy. Lack of access to the decision-maker was not a problem throughout the
hierarchy construction.
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It should be noted that in the context of this research that the experts and decisionmakers were one and the same. Applied to an actual DEW acquisition program, the
experts have authority to make limited decisions about HSI in the program. Other
stakeholders and decision-makers make important decisions throughout over which the
experts have little control. The experts are essentially the advocates for HSI within the
program and could use the model to support their suggestions.
3.3

VFT Process

3.3.1 Step 1: Problem Identification
The VFT steps shown in Figure 8 were used, starting with step 1. An incorrectly
framed problem leads to the wrong problem being solved. This failure will inevitably
lead to a poor decision because the decision will not be based on relevant analysis.
Framing the decision specifies three key aspects of the decision: purpose, perspective,
and scope (Parnell et al., 2013).
Purpose: Arguably the most important part of the problem is defining the purpose.
Sometimes the purpose is obvious and other times there might be a less obvious
definition. The question that needs to be answered in the “why.” In this research the
“why” was to measure the HSI in a DEW acquisition program.
Perspective: Questions such as “is this going to save money” or “how can we
increase the effectiveness” are examples of different views of the same problem. Coming
at the problem from different angles can be beneficial, but framing helps identify the key
issues and who should be making decisions.
Scope: The scope of the decision sets the boundary from which the problem will
be assembled. Areas outside the scope will not be examined and are deemed irrelevant to
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the problem at hand. This research focused specifically on the HSI in DEWs as opposed
to all weapon systems or other acquisition programs.
The first two meetings with the decision-maker confirmed the need for an
objective, defensible means to conduct HSI on a DEW acquisition program. The
HSI/DEW expert had many years of experience and knowledge and the current situation
had no standardized process for measuring the application of HSI. Too often, the
supervisor would let the expert know when enough was enough. Importantly, the process
was not necessarily repeatable from one DEW acquisition program to the next.
To better meet the needs of the acquisition program and thus support the DEW
system being developed, the many domains of HSI must be applied early and
deliberately. The alternatives can then be analyzed to see how HSI was applied to the
acquisition program. The Air Force states that the “goal of HSI is to maximize total
system performance, understanding that the human element is an integral part of systems,
while minimizing total ownership costs” (Carr & Greene, 2009a). Thus, the strategic
values remain constant across the board of acquisition programs. This gives a clear
indication of how HSI should be viewed during the acquisition process.
3.3.2 Step 2: Identify & Structure Objectives
The objectives definition phase went through several iterations after being
discussed during the first few interviews. At first, a strawman hierarchy was developed
through gold standard documents. After the first interactions and discussion, the
hierarchy was updated with the new platinum standard information. The decision-makers
agreed that the objective was to have a measurable way to fulfil their mandate of
including HSI in the acquisition process while also satisfying their own internal objective
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to “ensure weapons systems are designed, developed, or adapted with human capabilities
and limitations in mind” (Department of the Air Force, 2018). The goal was to determine
what was valued to achieve the fundamental objective and subsequently organize the
values from general to more specific, in hierarchal format. Keywords, concepts, ideas,
and values were recorded throughout each interview, sorted, and then grouped into
logical bunches. This led to the basis for the model’s first hierarchy.
The initial proposal had “Improve System Performance” as the fundamental
objective and the nine HSI domains as the Tier 1 objectives. Further discussion revealed
the initial fundamental objective was off the mark and missed addressing the identified
problem. Although “Improve System Performance” is a part of the objective, it is not the
primary objective. It was changed to “Integrate Human with DEW System” to capture the
essence of what VFT would do for this problem. This top-down method first identified
what is most important to the decision-maker and allowed the further breakdown of
important objectives. The nine HSI domains originally used as tier 1 objectives were
modified to their oft used combinations of Human Factors, MPT, ESOH, and Abilities
(comprised of Survivability and Habitability). The second tier is comprised of more
specific definitions of the nine HSI domains (first tier objectives). The third tier shows
the most important and relevant values from the second tier. Finally, the measures make
up the last tier and show the degree of attainment for the values in the previous tier. The
value hierarchy shell is shown in Figure 9 and depicts the three distinct tiers (the final
measures tier is not pictured). There are four tier 1 objectives, 11 tier 2, and 22 tier 3.
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Figure 9. Value Hierarchy

The first-tier objectives represent the same nine definitions previously covered in
Chapter II. The relationship between the nine HSI domains and the fundamental objective
represents a clear, logical way to view HSI in a given DEW program that results in a
mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive value hierarchy. There are some inherent
overlaps with the nine domains as they are originally structured. For example,
survivability and habitability can be argued to be sub-domains of human factors. The
challenges with some similarities and potential for cross-contamination between
objectives were overcome with second and third tier objectives that clearly defined how
they fit into the hierarchy. This still allowed for trade-offs to be made between objectives
while staying mutually exclusive. The first tier is shown in Figure 10 with the
fundamental objective on top. Each of the four branches are ordered by how the HSI
domains are normally addressed, but the order itself has no bearing on the problem. Each
branch is broken down further in Chapter IV. Definitions of the four tier 1 objectives are
shown in Table 3.
Integrate Human
with DEW
System

Human Factors

MPT

ESOH

Figure 10. Tier 1
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Abilities

Table 3. Abbreviated Definitions for Tier 1 (Drillings, Knapp, & Shattuck, 2015)
Human
Factors

MPT

ESOH

Abilities

The integration of human characteristics into system definition,
design, development, and evaluation to provide for effective human–
machine performance under operational conditions.
Manpower: The number of people needed to operate, maintain, train,
and support a system; includes military, civilians, and contractors.
Personnel: The performance-related characteristics of people needed
to operate, maintain, and support the system. This includes the
cognitive and physical capabilities required to train for, operate,
maintain, and sustain materiel and information systems.
Training: The process of designing and delivering a managed set of
experiences so that people have the knowledge, skills, and attitudes
that will enhance user capabilities, maintain skill proficiencies, and
decrease individual and collective training costs.
Environment: Those system design characteristics that serve to
minimize the impact of the system on the water, air, and land and the
interrelationship that exists among water, air, land, and all living
things. Prevalent issues include the prevention of pollution of the
environment by reducing the use of hazardous materials and the
release of pollutants into the environment.
Safety: The design features and operating characteristics of a system
that serve to minimize the risk of illness, disability, or death to users,
operators, and maintainers.
Occupational Health: Design features and operating characteristics
of a system that create significant risks of bodily injury or death.
Prominent sources of health hazards include acoustics energy,
chemical substances, biological substances, temperature extremes,
radiation energy, oxygen deficiency, shock (not electrical), trauma,
and vibration
Survivability: Ability of personnel to exist and function during and
following exposure to hostile situations or environments; includes
combat weapons-induced injuries, enemy or friendly casualties,
hazards inherent to personnel during threat or combat conditions, and
inherent hazards of military equipment to include egress when system
is damaged or destroyed.
Habitability: Those living and working conditions that are necessary
to sustain the morale, safety, health, and comfort of the user
population. These conditions directly contribute to personnel
effectiveness and mission accomplishment, and they often are related
to recruitment and retention problems.
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3.3.3 Step 3: Measure the Achievement of Objectives
HSI practices can be measured in numerous ways. Cognitive workload, for
example, has entire papers devoted to different methods of measurement. The practice
used in this model to obtain measurements focused on obtainability and sensibility. A
measure is of no use if the data cannot be obtained. Likewise, measurements that do not
encapsulate the correct attribute are of no use. Measures were obtained through
interviews with the decision-makers to ensure subject matter expertise was engrained into
the model. Chapter IV shows measures for the lowest tier objectives. This research did
not reach an in-depth conclusion regarding measures and instead provides proposals of
what could be used Chapter IV.
3.3.4 Step 4: Single Attribute Value Function
Single attribute value functions were not fully developed for this research. Like
step 3, only the method is explained. An example of a possible value function is
mentioned in Chapter 4.1.5.
Single attribute value functions (SAVFs) are used to standardize the measures
across the hierarchy. Exponential, linear (including piecewise linear), categorical/discrete
functions are the most common methods used (Kirkwood, 1996). The piecewise linear
function contains line segments of varying slopes. A generic example of categorical data
would be yes/no or low/medium/high options. With categorical data, each category (or
choice) is assigned a number representing the capability. The lowest acceptable threshold
was given a value of 0 while the best was given a score of 1. In the yes/no example, no
would have a score of 0 while yes would score 1. In a low/medium/high example, the
medium could possibly have a score of 0.5 or anywhere else between 0 and 1 based on
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the decision-maker’s preference. Exponential functions of increasing preference signify
that small inputs results in small outputs while large inputs result in large outputs. Larger
numbers are preferred in these cases because they add more value. The value function is
shown in Equation (1). The opposite is true for exponential functions of decreasing
preference shown in Equation (2).

1 − exp[−(𝑥 − 𝐿𝑜𝑤)/𝜌]
,
𝜌 ≠ 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦
1 − exp[−(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝐿𝑜𝑤)/𝜌]
𝑣(𝑥) =
𝑥 − 𝐿𝑜𝑤
,𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
{ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝐿𝑜𝑤

(1)

1 − exp[−(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝑥)/𝜌]
,
𝜌 ≠ 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦
1 − exp[−(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝐿𝑜𝑤)/𝜌]
𝑣(𝑥) =
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝑥
,𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
{ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝐿𝑜𝑤

(2)

3.3.5 Step 5: Multi Attribute Value Function (Weights)
Appropriately applying weights to each attribute is a major part of the VFT
process. The weights signify the importance of each attribute and account for differing
scores for attributes with the same values. However, importance does not convey
everything about weights. Keeney (1992) says, “if the value trade-offs are done properly
and address the question of how much of one specific attribute is worth how much of
another specific attribute, the insights from the analysis are greatly increased and the
likelihood of misuse of those judgments is greatly decreased.” Local weights are those
within the same branch and tier, that when summed equal 1. Figure 11 shows an example
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of local weights. Attribute 1’s weight of 0.75 and Attribute’s 2 weight of 0.25 summed
together equal 1. Likewise, Sub 1A’s 0.20 and Sub 1B’s 0.80 equal 1.

Objective
Attribute 1
0.75
Sub 1A
0.20

Attribute 2
0.25

Sub 1B
0.80

Sub 2A
0.65

Sub 2B
0.35

Figure 11. Local Weights

Global weights are similar except they sum to 1 across each row as shown by the
numbers enclosed in parenthesis in Figure 12. Global weights can be viewed as each
attribute’s max contribution to the overall score. Global weights can be determined either
hierarchical or non-hierarchical. The hierarchical approach views each objective as it
appears in the hierarchy and can be completed either top-down or bottom-up. The nonhierarchical approach views only the lowest tier objectives. Once weights are determined,
the upper-tier weights are calculated.
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Objective
Attribute 1
0.75 (0.75)
Sub 1A
0.20 (0.15)

Attribute 2
0.25 (0.25)

Sub 1B
0.80 (0.60)

Sub 2A
0.65 (0.16)

Sub 2B
0.35 (0.09)

Figure 12. Global Weights

The decision-makers used a direct weighting method (100-ball) to determine all
weights. This method entails the decision-maker ranking each attribute on a scale of 1 to
100. As explained in the preceding paragraphs, local weights across tiers and within
branches will sum to 1, or 100 in the context of this method. Likewise, global weights
will also sum to 100 across rows. The decision-maker pictured having 100 balls to
allocate to attributes. After distributing the balls to each attribute, the decision-maker
reviewed his allocations with the understanding that an attribute assigned a weight of 50
indicated it was twice as important as one assigned a 25.
A baseline estimation was provided to them based on previous discussions and
they both made adjustments as needed. Using the top-down approach, they started with
tier 1 and worked their way down to the lowest tier. At the conclusion of that session, the
weights were verified to represent the importance of each attribute. Final weights will be
discussed in Chapter IV.
The 100-ball method was used because of incomplete measures and value
functions. This method is a type of importance weight, that is, weights are assigned to
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measures independent of the variation of the measure range. A more widely accepted
method for determining weights is known as swing-weighting. In this method, both
importance and variation of the scales of value measures are taken into account (Keeney,
1992). For example, if we reduce the range of one of the measure scales while holding all
other measure ranges constant, the measure’s relative weight decreases while all other
weights increase. A swing-weight matrix is proposed by Parnell (2009) as a tool for
decision-makers to assess swing weights.
3.3.6 Step 6: Alternative Generation
The timing can greatly affect the alternative generation process, given the nature
of the acquisition process and when the HSI practitioners are first called upon for input.
Pre Milestone A input would be different than later in the process. Sometimes there may
be pre-existing alternatives in which case plugging in the numbers provides an easy
comparison. The model can also be used to determine which trade-offs give the most
benefit. The realization of trade-offs is one of the cornerstones of a VFT model. Taking
away functionality in one area may lead to improved functionality elsewhere, resulting in
a better overall system.
3.3.7 Step 7: Alternative Scoring
Scoring is completed by inputting the appropriate values into the model. A best
practice is to have the decision-maker, or whoever is completing the scoring portion, to
not review the weights or value functions prior to categorizing or assigning the
appropriate value. This prevents the person from changing the value based on how they
think the score may change due to its weight or particulars of it
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3.3.8 Step 8: Deterministic Analysis
Deterministic analysis examines the results of the model. Different ways of
visualizing the alternatives are used to gain insights into the results. Two popular
examples are the value breakout and cost vs value charts. The value breakout chart
displays each alternative in a bar chart where it is easy to see how much each attribute
contributes to the total score. The cost vs value chart depicts each alternative in relation
to its cost (x-axis) and value (y-axis). Both charts, and others, can help uncover
information within the model that may not be apparent at first glance.
3.3.9 Step 9: Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis examines whether different assumptions lead to different
scores and consequently, a reordering of the ranked alternatives. The most common
aspect to change is the weights. For example, if a weight equaled 50% of the overall
model, reducing it to 25% could have an impact on the alternatives’ ranks.
3.4

Summary and Preview
This chapter discussed the methods and procedures used to build the value

hierarchy. The primary methods used were a series of in-depth interviews with the
decision-makers, who were also subject matter experts in the applicable disciplines. The
foundational input from both the experts and the Air Force’s HSI Handbook resulted in a
credible and defendable value hierarchy. Chapter IV will cover the nuances of each
branch including objective definitions and associated measures.
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IV. Results

The conclusion of interviews with the decision-makers resulted in a value
hierarchy for use on DEW acquisition programs. Each branch of the hierarchy will be
decomposed by objective. The objectives will be defined and proposed measures
outlined. Finally, proposed weights are discussed. As explained more in Chapter V, the
hierarchy needs some additional refinement before it could be used effectively. Figure 13
shows the first tier of the hierarchy.

Integrate
Human with
DEW System

Human Factors

MPT

ESOH

Abilities

Figure 13. Tier 1 (repeated)

4.1

Decomposition of Branches
Each branch (Human Factors, MPT, ESOH, and Abilities) will be explained with

a visual representation, objective definitions to the lowest tier, and summary of measures.
A branch-by-branch review was chosen over a step-by-step summary to offer a holistic
view of each branch. The weighting portion is covered separately in the chapter to build a
complete picture of the hierarchy.
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4.1.1 Human Factors Branch
The human factors branch is an important part of HSI and is often mistaken as
being the only HSI domain. This is probably because even without knowing it, people
associate “human systems integration” with the directly human aspects found in human
factors. The human factors branch, shown in Figure 14 and defined in Table 4, consists of
three tier-2 objectives, each with two tier-3 objectives for a total of six lowest level
objectives. With human factors as the overarching principle, a summary of the measures
is shown in Table 5 and defined in Table 6.

Human
Factors

Cognitive

Workload

Physical

DSS

Interface

Organizational

Controls

Figure 14. Human Factors Branch
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User
Experience

Team Dynamic

Table 4. Definitions of Human Factors Branch
Human Factors
Cognitive
Workload
Decision Support System
Physical
Interface
Controls
Organizational
User Experience
Team Dynamic

Suitable integration of human
characteristics into system.
Psychological processes of decision
making and problem solving.
Level of mental effort put forth.
Whether a decision support system (DSS)
can assist.
Relation of human interactions with the
world.
Whether the point of interaction between
human and system
Appropriate placement of touchpoints.
Connections between user, encompassing
system, and other crew.
Satisfaction of user while operating
system.
Whether relationship between crew
members affects functionality.
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Lowest-Tier
Hierarchy
Value

Associated
Measure

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Cognitive

Workload

Speed of Kill
Chain

Slower

Faster

Decision
Support
System

Error Rate

5%

0%

Physical

Interface

Ease of Use

Controls

Reachability

Hard

Easy

Organizational

Table 5. Summary of Measures for Human Factors Branch

User
Experience

Satisfaction
Level

Low

High

Team Dynamic

Task
Dependencies

100%

0%

Various

Table 6. Definitions of Human Factors Measures
Measure

Definition

Speed of Kill Chain (workload)

The speed at which the operator can
complete the kill chain, i.e. faster or
slower than opposing force.

Error Rate

How often the DSS provides inaccurate
information.

Ease of Use

The ease at which an operator can interact
with the system.

Reachability

How difficult it is for the operator to reach
controls.

Satisfaction Level

Whether an operator experiences
fulfillment from operating the system.

Task Dependencies

The operator’s reliance on other crew
members to operate effectively.
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4.1.2 MPT Branch
The MPT branch, shown in Figure 15 and defined in Table 7, consists of three
tier-2 objectives and a total of nine lowest level objectives. The reader may notice the
“personnel” in MPT is represented in the hierarchy as Knowledge, Skills, and Attributes
(KSAs). This distinction is due to KSAs being the primary personnel factor to consider
for this research. The four lowest-level objectives for both Manpower and KSAs are
identical. This is because the type of manpower to consider are the same people who need
to possess the requisite KSAs. With MPT as the overarching principle, a summary of the
measures is shown in Table 8 and defined in Table 9.

MPT

Manpower

Operators

Maintainers

Support

KSAs

Trainers

Operators

Maintainers

Figure 15. MPT Branch
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Training

Support

Trainers

System

Table 7. Definitions of MPT Branch
MPT
Manpower

The number of people needed to employ
system.

Operators

People who operate the system.

Maintainers

People who maintain the system.

Support Personnel

People who support the system.

Trainers
KSAs

People who provide training for the
operation, maintenance, and support of the
system.
Knowledge, skills, and abilities pertinent
to employment of the system.

Operators

People who operate the system.

Maintainers

People who maintain the system.

Support Personnel

People who support the system.

Trainers
Training
System

People who provide training for the
operation, maintenance, and support of the
system.
The experiences and tools used to teach
system users what they need to know.
Classes, instructions, manuals, aids, and
anything else that is used to provide
training.
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Table 8. Summary of Measures for MPT Branch
Lowest-Tier
Hierarchy Value

Associated
Measure

Lower
Bound

Upper
Bound

Personnel
Required
Relative to
Legacy System

More

Less

ASVAB Score

High

Low

Course Length
(wks)

12

1

Manpower

Operators
Maintainers
Support
Trainers

KSAs

Operators
Maintainers
Support

Training

Trainers

System

Table 9. Definitions of MPT Measures
Measure

Definition

Personnel Required Relative to Legacy
System

The number of personnel required
compared to the legacy system. This
includes operators, maintainers, support
personnel, and trainers.

ASVAB Score

The Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery score.

Length (wks)

The length of formal training for
operators.
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4.1.3 ESOH Branch
The ESOH branch, shown in Figure 16 and defined in Table 10, consists of three
tier 2 objectives and an equal number of lowest level objectives. They are, in essence,
proxy attributes to the tier-2 objectives. As noted in the next section, the equal number of
tier-2 and tier-3 objectives result in both tiers having the same weights. The reason for the
further decomposition is to clarify what objective is actually being measured. It also
makes more sense when paired with the remainder of the hierarchy so each branch has a
similar number of tiers. With ESOH as the overarching principle, a summary of the
measures is shown in Table 10 and defined in Table 11.

ESOH

Environment

Safety

Occupational
Health

Application

Mishaps

Exposure

Figure 16. ESOH Branch
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Table 10. Definitions of ESOH Branch
ESOH
Environment
Application
Safety
Mishaps
Occupational Health
Exposure

Characteristics that minimize the impact
of the system on the world around it.
Whether methods of smart employment
are known.
Characteristics that minimize risk of
injury.
Any unplanned event that results in
personal injury or property damage.
Risks from the system itself.
Whether effects can be controlled to
minimize accidental exposure to persons
other than targets.

Occupational
Health

Safety

Environment

Table 11. Summary of Measures for ESOH Branch

Lowest-Tier
Hierarchy Value

Associated
Measure

Lower
Bound

Upper
Bound

Application

Do operational
plans include
methods/reasons
for
employment?

No

Yes

Mishaps

Exposure

A

>3%

B

>4%

C

>6%

D

>8%

Likelihood of
Accidental
Exposure

10%

Incident
Rate by
Class
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0%

0%

Table 12. Definitions of ESOH Measures
Measure

Definition
Planning guidance taking into account
DEWs. Do leaders and operators possess
the know-how of when to employ the
weapon?
The DoD categorizes into four classes:
A - >$2M in damages
B - >$500,000 in damages
C - >$50,000 in damages
D - >$20,000 in damages

Do operational plans include
methods/reasons for employment?

Incident Rate by Class

Chance of non-target being exposed to the
weapon’s beam.

Likelihood of Accidental Exposure

4.1.4 Abilities Branch
The Abilities branch, shown in Figure 17 and defined in Table 13, consists of two
tier-2 objectives, each with two lowest level objectives, for a total of four lowest-level
objectives. With Abilities as the overarching principle, a summary of the measures is
shown in Table 12 and defined in Table 13.

Abilities

Survivability

Susceptibility

Habitability

Vulnerability

SWaP

Figure 17. Abilities Branch
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Workspace
Layout

Table 13. Definitions of Abilities Branch
Abilities
Ability to function in hostile situations or
environments.

Survivability
Susceptibility

Inability to avoid threats.

Vulnerability

Inability to withstand hits.

Habitability
SWaP
Workspace Layout

Living and working conditions to sustain
users of the system.
Reasonable size, weight, and power for
system.
Characteristics of the workspace such as
temperature and lighting conditions.

Survivability

Table 14. Summary of Measures for Abilities Branch

Lowest-Tier
Hierarchy Value

Associated
Measure

Lower
Bound

Upper
Bound

Susceptibility

Probability of
DEW Hit

100%

0%

Vulnerability

Probability of
DEW Kill

100%

0%

Dimensions

Habitability

SWaP

Weight (lbs)

Varies by System Enclosing
the DEW System

Power Used
(kW)
Lighting (fc)

30

50

HVAC

Worst

Best

Workspace Layout

71

Table 15. Definitions of Abilities Measures
Measure

Definition

Probability of DEW Hit

How likely the DEW system is to take a
hit.

Probability of DEW Kill

How likely the DEW system is to cease
functioning after a hit.

Dimensions

Total size of the system in length, width,
height.

Weight (lbs)

How much the system weighs.

Power Used (kW)

How much power the system uses.

Lighting (fc)

The amount of lighting in the workspace.

HVAC

The heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning of the workspace.

4.1.5 Example SAVFs
Two example SAVFs are shown in Figures Figure 18 and Figure 19. Figure 18
shows a possible SAVF for the length of training in weeks. If the length of training were
one week, it would receive a score of 1, the highest possible score. A length of 12 weeks
would result in a score of 0, the lowest possible value. The midvalue of four weeks would
receive a score of 0.5. When determining SAVFs, the midvalue can change based on the
decision-maker’s discretion. Whereas some may keep the midvalue exactly in the middle
of the range, others could feel the midvalue was closer to the extremes, changing the
value in the process.

72

Value

SAVF for Training Length

Length (weeks)
Figure 18. Example Exponential SAVF

Figure 19 shows a possible SAVF for illuminance of the workspace as measured
in foot candles (fc). An illuminance equal to 30 fc would score 0, the lowest possible
value. An illuminance equal to 50 fc would score 1, the highest possible value. An
illuminance equal to 40 fc would score 0.5, the mid-value.
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Value

SAVF for Workspace Lighting

Lighting (foot candles)
Figure 19. Example Linear SAVF

4.2

Hierarchy Weights
Weights across tiers will be displayed in the same manner as discussed in the

previous chapter, with global weights enclosed in parenthesis. The tier-1 weights are
shown in Figure 20 and Figure 21. The tier-1 weights have equal local and global
weights. It was determined that the MPT branch was the most important and thus
deserved a weight of 0.55, the highest of any objective. The relatively high importance
stems from the fact that most costs over the life of a system come from the people
involved with said system. Second most important was Human Factors at 0.20, followed
by ESOH at 0.15 and Abilities at 0.10. The decision-makers were careful not to discount
any particular objective and weighted them appropriately based on their observance of
practiced procedures and sentiments.
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Integrate
Human with
DEW System
Human Factors
0.20

MPT
0.55

ESOH
0.15

Abilities
0.10

Figure 20. Tier 1 Weights

A graph of the weight distribution is shown in Figure 21. As mentioned in the
previous paragraph, MPT holds the highest weight and thus is the most important to the
decision-maker. As visualized below, it is almost three times more important than the
next highest attribute, Human Factors. To put how much more weight MPT has than the
other attributes in perspective, it is about 3.5 times more than ESOH and 4.5 times more
than Abilities. Likewise, the 0.20 weight for Human Factors is twice as big as Abilities’
0.10 weight. The remainder of the hierarchy is broken down in the following sections.
Tier 1 Weights
0.6
0.5

Weight

0.4

0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Human Factors

MPT

ESOH

Tier 1 Attribute

Figure 21. Tier 1 Weights Chart
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Abilities

4.2.1 Human Factors Weights
Human Factors was broken down into three tier-2 objectives, with each of those
being broken into two tier-3 objectives (shown in Figure 22). Cognitive, Physical, and
Organizational have local weights of 0.55, 0.35, and 0.10, respectively. The global
weights are 0.11, 0.07, and 0.02. Global weights have meaning in the overall hierarchy
discussion. Out of the entire 20% weight Human Factors has in the hierarchy, Cognitive
is 11%, Physical 7%, and Organizational 2%. If each category was given the maximum
score, it would equal 20% of the total score.

Human Factors
0.20

Cognitive
0.55 (0.11)

Workload
0.50 (0.055)

DSS
0.50 (0.055)

Physical
0.35 (0.07)

Interface
0.50 (0.035)

Controls
0.50 (0.035)

Organizational
0.10 (0.02)

User Experience
0.50 (0.01)

Team Dynamic
0.50 (0.01)

Figure 22. Human Factors Weights

Cognitive: The cognitive objective had the highest weight among the three tier-2
objectives. This is due to the assertion that operating a DEW is mostly mental as opposed
to a physical toll on the body. The tier-3 objectives of Workload and DSS were given
equal local weights of 0.50, resulting in identical global weights of 0.055. The global
weights indicate a top score in each category would result in 11% of the total score, at
5.5% each.

76

Physical: The physical objective had the second highest weight of 0.35 and like
cognitive, had two tier-3 objectives. The Interface and Controls were locally weighted
evenly at 0.50, resulting in global weights of 0.035. The global weights indicate a top
score in each category would result in 7% of the total score, at 3.5% each.
Organizational: The organizational objective was deemed the least important with
a weight of 0.10. Again, two tier-3 objectives of User Experience a Team Dynamic were
used. The local weights were 0.50 and global 0.01. The global weights indicate a top
score in each category would result in 2% of the total score, at 1% each.
4.2.2 MPT Weights
MPT was broken down into three tier-2 objectives and a total of nine tier-3
objectives (shown in Figure 23). Manpower, KSAs, and Training have local weights of
0.30, 0.50, and 0.20, respectively. The global weights are 0.165, 0.275, and 0.11. This
branch has the highest weights of all the branches, signifying the importance of
manpower, personnel, and training. KSAs are the most important objective in the
hierarchy, accounting for 27.5% of the total score. Second most important is Manpower
at 16.5% followed by Training at 11%. Cognitive, from the Human Factors branch, also
comprises 11% of the total score. MPT and Human Factors combine to account for 75%
of the total potential score.
MPT
0.55
Manpower
0.30 (0.165)
Operators
0.60 (0.099)

Maintainers
0.15 (0.025)

Support
0.15 (0.025)

KSAs
0.50 (0.275)
Trainers
0.10 (0.017)

Operators
0.60 (0.165)

Maintainers
0.15 (0.041)

Figure 23. MPT Weights
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Support
0.15 (0.041)

Training
0.20 (0.11)
Trainers
0.10 (0.028)

System
1 (0.11)

Manpower: The manpower objective was deemed second most important of the
MPT branch with a weight of 0.30. Four tier-3 objectives of Operators, Maintainers,
Support, and Trainers were used. The Operators objective was deemed most important
with a local weight of 0.60 and global weight of 0.099. Maintainers and Support share
equal importance with local weights of 0.15 and global weights of 0.025. Least important
was Trainers at 0.10 and 0.017. The global weights indicate a top score in each category
would result in 16.5% of the total score, with 9.9% allocated to Operators, 2.5% each to
Maintainers and Support, and 1.7% to Trainers.
KSAs: The KSAs objective was deemed most important of the MPT branch,
which also made it the most important objective to the hierarchy. The four tier-3
objectives are identical to those in the Manpower objective and share the same local
weights of Operators – 0.60, Maintainers – 0.15, Support – 0.15, and Trainers – 0.10.
However, due to the increased weight of the tier-2 KSAs objective, the global weights are
larger at 0.165, 0.041, 0.041, and 0.028, respectively. The global weights indicate a top
score in each category would result in 27.5% of the total score, with 16.5% allocated to
Operators, 4.1% each to Maintainers and Support, and 2.8% to Trainers.
Training: The Training objective was deemed the least important with a weight
of 0.20. The one tier-3 objective of System has a local weight of 1 and global weight of
0.11. The global weight indicates a top score in System would result in 11% of the total
score.
4.2.3 ESOH Weights
ESOH was broken down into three tier-2 objectives, each with only one tier-3
objective (shown in Figure 24). Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health have local
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weights of 0.20, 0.60, and 0.20, respectively. The global weights are 0.03, 0.09, and 0.03.
A large drop in importance can be seen in the weights for the three tier-2 objectives.
Environment and Occupational Health account for 6% of the total score at 3% each while
Safety is 9%. To add context, the KSAs of Trainers in the MPT branch account for 2.8%
of the total score, which is almost the same as both Environment and Occupational
Health individually. Each of the three tier 2 objectives only had one tier 3 objective,
meaning global weights in both tiers were identical. To add context, the Manpower of
Operators in the MPT branch equal 9.9%, about 1% more than the Mishaps weight.

ESOH
0.15

Environment
0.20 (0.03)

Safety
0.60 (0.09)

Occupational
Health
0.20 (0.03)

Application
1 (0.03)

Mishaps
1 (0.09)

Exposure
1 (0.03)

Figure 24. ESOH Weights

4.2.4 Abilities Weights
Abilities was broken down into two tier-2 objectives, each with two tier-3
objectives (shown in Figure 25). Survivability and Habitability have local weights of 0.30
and 0.70, respectively. The global weights are 0.03 and 0.07. They indicate a top score in
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each category would result in 10% of the total score, with 3% allocated to Survivability
and 7% to Habitability.

Abilities
0.10

Survivability
0.30 (0.03)

Susceptibility
0.50 (0.015)

Habitability
0.70 (0.07)

Vulnerability
0.50 (0.015)

SWaP
0.50 (0.035)

Workspace
Layout
0.50 (0.035)

Figure 25. Abilities Weights

Both tier-2 attributes of Survivability and Habitability have two tier 3 attributes.
Survivability is divided into Susceptibility at 0.50 local and Vulnerability at 0.50 local.
Their global weights are both 0.015. Habitability is divided into SWaP at 0.50 local and
Workspace Layout at 0.50 local. Both global weights are 0.035. The global weights of
Susceptibility and Vulnerability are 1.5%, the lowest in the entire hierarchy. This is not to
say these attributes are unimportant. Rather, it says they are the least important when
compared to all other attributes.
4.3

Steps 6-9: Alternative Generation, Scoring, and Analysis
These steps were not applicable to the problem because there were no ongoing,

accessible DEW acquisition projects from which to garner data. This does not invalidate
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the method because VFT is already proven as a method to solve these types of problems,
i.e. complex, significant consequences, and multiple objectives.
4.4

Step 10: Communicating Results
Results can be communicated in various ways and tailored to specific audiences

or decision-makers. Recommendations can be made and it is important to note that the
highest scoring alternative may not always be the best choice given certain assumptions
of other influencers to the problem.
4.5

Usefulness of Hierarchy
A decision-maker should be able to use this hierarchy as a starting point for

recognizing what is important when applying HSI principles to a DEW acquisition
program. The hierarchy itself will not produce any output. Three possible options for
inputting data are The Perduco Group’s web-based VFT Tool, the Microsoft Excel
version developed by Dr. Weir at AFIT, or the “DecisionAnalysis” package developed by
Deehr (2018) located on the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN) website,
written in the programming language R. All packages will perform the same calculations
and output identical values. Once the values are input and scores are calculated,
alternatives can be compared against each other. Then adjustments can be made to certain
values to generate new alternatives that may not have previously been options.
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V.

Conclusion

This chapter reiterates the complex nature of military acquisition and the need to
incorporate human systems integration (HSI) early in the process. To effectively combat
future threats to the accomplishment of the Air Force’s mission, game-changing
technologies are needed. One such technology is a directed energy weapon (DEW). An
issue with DEW acquisition is the lack of a formal measurement of HSI in the acquisition
process. Since the incorporation of HSI can result in substantial cost savings and a better
overall weapon system, a value-focused thinking (VFT) is proposed to measure the
effectiveness of HSI. However, future work is needed to transform this model into a
useful tool for HSI practitioners.
5.1

Conclusion
The military’s acquisition process is a long, complex process that becomes even

more complex with efforts to procure weapons that will provide superiority on the
battlefield for years to come. These types of weapons are often more expensive due to the
technological advances over their predecessors. Directed energy weapons have proved
costly to develop over time, are technologically advanced, and require a specific skillset
and knowledge to be utilized properly. All factors combined, this research shows how
knowledge can be obtained from a DEW and HSI expert and converted into a value
hierarchy using VFT. The value hierarchy can then be used in subsequent DEW
procurements to focus effort on specific HSI components.
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Through the use of multi-domain expert knowledge and a codified process,
organizations such as the Air Force can use VFT and its value hierarchy multiple times
with minimal additional time and work investment. The value hierarchy contains all
objectives important to the organization (or at least the decision-maker) and attributes
that allow the measurement of each objective. After inputting applicable values, VFT
provides a score for each alternative. This allows decision-makers to compare alternatives
not just by rank, but by degree of objective achievement. VFT’s strengths of
repeatability, alternative generation, sensitivity analysis, and alternative scoring make it a
good fit for evaluating HSI practices within a DEW acquisition program.
The hierarchy shows the majority of time and effort should be spent on the
Manpower, Personnel, and Training HSI domains, as evidenced by the 55% weighting of
the MPT objective. One reason for the overwhelming importance of MPT is due to cost.
Over the life-cycle of a DEW system, or any acquisition program, the majority of costs
occur in the operations and support phase (Schwartz, 2014). In this phase, much of the
cost inevitably pertains to manpower, personnel, and training. Therefore, correctly
ascertaining the optimal mix of operators, maintainers, support personnel, and trainers for
the new system will help accurately forecast lifecycle costs. Getting the number of
personnel right is just one aspect. Correctly training and employing all personnel is
another factor to consider and is not covered within the model. Training length is
included in the model to account for the benefit of less training time. Likewise, requiring
less personnel to run the new system can only be seen as beneficial. Selecting the right
personnel is also important. Personnel with a higher ASVAB score would require less
training time and be better suited initially to run the system. However, higher scoring
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personnel would be harder to obtain due to their demand elsewhere. This in turn could
lead to higher recruiting costs or a possible shortage of needed personnel. The HSI
domains of manpower, personnel, and training are vitally important to acquisition
programs and weapon systems. If nothing else, a user of this model should focus their
efforts on these three HSI domains to influence the acquisition effort and development of
the system.
The next area of focus should be the HSI domain of Human Factors. As
mentioned previously, many people only think of human factors when thinking of HSI.
This is due in part to the very physical relation between the human and the machine,
which is enveloped within the human factors domain. The real link between human and
machine grabs peoples’ attention and causes them to forget about the other HSI domains.
However, this model weights the Human Factors objective at 20%, a full 35% lower than
the 55% of the MPT objective. Together, the top two weighted objectives account for
75% of the model. The remaining 25% is still important, just not as central to DEW
system characteristics.
This research successfully answered the first investigative question of whether an
expert’s knowledge of the HSI domains could be represented in a value hierarchy.
Although this is only one possible solution, this model proves that the nine HSI domains
can be represented in a value hierarchy. Other than simple pasting the titles of the nine
domains into a hierarchal format, the beauty of a value hierarchy is the knowledge it
contains. The weights are telling figures that demonstrate the relative importance of the
nine domains as they relate to a DEW system. The attributes further reveal aspects of HSI
that make a difference in DEW systems.

84

Knowledge was captured from an HSI expert and transferred via the creation of
the value hierarchy. The hierarchy itself serves as a repository for the knowledge and
indicates what a person should focus on when conducting HSI assessments of a DEW
acquisition program. A fully produced model could improve a DEW acquisition program
by providing insight into areas of concern. For example, if the model produced a score of
20 out of 55 for the MPT objective, that tells the decision-maker the particular DEW
acquisition program is not doing well in manpower, personnel, or training. Further
investigation would reveal a more precise reason for the low score. This knowledge by
itself could provide insight into ways to change or otherwise improve the DEW program.
It could also be combined with other methods such as cost estimation to provide further
insight.
5.2

Future Work
There are four primary ways to develop this model into a useful tool given more

time, data, and organizational involvement. First, refining the measures of each attribute
would allow the input of data when it becomes available. As they stand, the measures are
proposed and do not have value functions to back them up. The decision was made to not
use the sponsor’s time developing value measures that would not be used at this time.
While still useful, the model needs to be fully flushed out and applied before it can be
proven to be a viable method of assessing HSI within a DEW acquisition program.
Second, fully developing and using the VFT model on a real dataset would put the
model to use and allow the sponsoring organization to see if results were helpful. The
absence of real-world data resulted in a premature stopping point in the development of
the model. As a result, the model lacks the ability to produce some of the more insightful
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aspects of VFT analysis, notably deterministic and sensitivity analysis. Once steps 3 & 4
are fully completed, swing-weighting should be used to reassess weights. This would be a
more complete approach to determining weights by accounting for both importance and
variation in measures.
Third, additional expert elicitation on HSI would bring more perspective and
ideas to the table. At the beginning of the decision analysis process, ideas and
brainstorming act as the foundation for building the hierarchy. More ideas at the start of
the process could lead to a more comprehensive hierarchy by not omitting something that
a single expert may have overlooked. At the very least, a discussion could take place
involving multiple personalities to gain new perspectives. Care must be taken to ask
experts questions from their field of expertise.
Finally, additional VFT models could be developed to account for differences in
the acquisition phases. Some measures may not be applicable in the early phases and
could paint an inaccurate picture of the state of alternatives. It is also possible to evaluate
alternatives based on estimations and projections and then refining the estimates into
quantifiable data as it becomes available.
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